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Abstract. The only two seafood commodities traded in futures markets are frozen white and black tiger shrimps on the 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGE).  These two contracts, however, have failed to attract the expected trade volume based on 
the underlying shrimp cash market flow.  First, we investigate the hedging effectiveness of these contracts.  Then we also try to 
determine the adequacy of the premiums/discounts for non-par deliveries associated with the various shrimp size categories 
traded in each contract.  Finally, we attempt to determine whether these contracts are unbiased predictors of cash market prices.  
The analyses indicate that the hedging effectiveness of both contracts is relatively modest.  It is concluded that part of the 
explanation for the performance of the contracts resides in high deliverable category exchange option values, which stem from 
volatility in the price differentials between size categories.  Results indicate ineffective premiums/discounts and poor predictive 
ability of both contracts. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Currently, two shrimp futures contracts are being traded at 
the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGE): one is for white 
shrimp and the other one for black tiger shrimp.  These two 
contracts include several deliverable varieties within each 
contract.  Shrimp varieties are usually separated based on 
size, species, and origin.  Par white shrimp include the 
species Penaeus vannamei, Penaeus occidentalis and 
Penaeus stylirostris from the western hemisphere, while the 
par black tiger shrimp is the species Penaeus monodon, 
from Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia.  The par size 
category for the black tiger shrimp futures contract is 21-25 
(count per pound) cpp, while the non-par categories 
permitted for delivery are 16-20 and 26-30 cpp.  For the 
white shrimp futures contract, on the other hand, the par 
category is 41-50 cpp.  The non-par size categories 
accepted by the MGE are 31-35, 36-40, and 51-60 cpp.  In 
order to standardize the trade of shrimp within each 
contract, premiums and discounts have been introduced for 
shrimp that deviate from par size categories and species by 
the MGE (MGE 1993; 1997a; 1997b). Premiums and 
discounts have already changed twice for the white shrimp 
contract and once for the black tiger contract. 
 
Both contracts, however, have failed to attract the expected 
trade volume based on the existing shrimp cash market 
flow.  The motivation of this study is to find out the 
underlying reasons for such a lukewarm reception from 
traders. 
 
First the hedging effectiveness of each contract is assessed 
for each variety within each contract. Then, the focus shifts 
to determine whether the premiums and discounts for each 
variety are working properly.  Finally, we estimate the 
ability of each contract to predict spot prices. 
 
 
2.   HEDGING EFFECTIVENESS
1 
 
The analyses are carried out from a producer perspective 
(i.e., short hedger) because in multiple delivery contracts 
the delivery alternative is controlled by the short, not long, 
hedger (Chance and Hemler, 1993).  Producers hold short 
positions in the contracts for two weeks.  Participants in 
these contracts have indicated that the two week hedge 
scenario choice is representative of usual hedge periods.   
Although hedges using shrimp contracts are also held for 
longer periods, we focused on two week hedges to increase 
the sample size of our analyses.  Therefore, a typical 
hedging scenario would involve a hedger buying shrimp in 
the spot market and selling a number of futures contracts in 
the same day.  Then, two weeks later the hedger would 
offset the position in the futures market and sell the shrimp 
bought two weeks before in the spot market.  For example, 
the first simulated hedge for the black tiger shrimp contract 
goes short in 4/6/95 and is offset in 4/20/95 at the spot 
prices and closing futures prices for the June-95 contract 
determined by the market at those dates.  The futures prices 
used are those from the nearby contract during non-delivery 
months and the next nearest contract during delivery 
months.  For each maturity contract, three to four hedges per 
month were estimated by overlapping hedges. 
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The effectiveness of optimal and full hedges is studied 
based on the simulated two week short hedges.  Three 
strategies are simulated: no-hedge, full hedge (i.e. the hedge 
ratio is equal to one) and minimum expected variance 
hedge.  For the hedges, the revenues (R) from each trading 
strategy are given by 
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where h is the hedge ratio, and fi and Pi
j are the futures and 
cash prices for the j
th grade at time i.  The hedge ratio is one 
for the full hedge strategy.  The hedge ratio chosen for the 
analyses is the traditional minimum risk hedge ratio 
(Benninga, Eldor and Zilcha, 1984).  For this study, the 
assumptions of the simplified hedging rule were accepted 
for its application.   This ratio is calculated using first 
differences of weekly prices provided by Urner-Barry 
Publications (1993-1998) and the MGE (1997a). 
 
The hedging performance of the black tiger shrimp contract 
for the 16-20 cpp category shows a 18.85% reduction in 
risk return.  Also, the results from the optimal hedging 
strategy, on the average, present a 20.50% and 16.39% risk 
reduction for the 21-25 and 26-30 cpp categories, 
respectively.  The full hedging strategy results in a slight 
risk reduction only for the par category (21-25 cpp), while 
for the non-par categories the risk increases relative to the 
unhedged position. 
 
In the case of the white shrimp contract, minimum variance 
hedging on this contract reduces return uncertainty, on the 
average, for all four categories.  The largest reduction is for 
the 41-50 cpp par category with 20.76%, while for the rest, 
the reduction in risk is much smaller.  Full hedges, however, 
result in higher return risk than in the unhedged strategy, for 
all size categories. 
 
 
3.   PREMIUMS/DISCOUNTS
2 
 
The existence of consistent perverse incentives for arbitrage 
that could have damaged the performance of the contracts is 
also explored.  This could be the case if the embedded 
quality option alternates to be between out-of-the-money 
and deep in-the-money frequently.  The quality option 
implicit in futures contracts allows the short hedger to 
satisfy the contract by delivering one of a variety of 
specified assets.  If, at the time the contract is purchased 
knowledge of which of the allowed assets will be cheapest 
at maturity is uncertain, then the quality option will have 
value.  In a well designed contract, premiums/discounts 
associated with non-par deliveries should cancel out the 
value of the option to exchange par and non-par categories 
                                                             
2 More details on these analyses can be found in Martínez-
Garmendia and Anderson (1999). 
provided the price differential is relatively constant.   
Otherwise, the short hedger will choose to deliver the 
cheapest of the allowed assets.  This creates uncertainty on 
the long hedgers side as to what delivery to expect.  Such 
uncertainty, may detract long hedgers from participating in 
the contract.  Even if the hedged position is lifted before 
delivery occurs, the existence of valuable options tends, 
also, to reduce the hedging effectiveness of the contract.   
This deleterious effect of quality options on the survival of a 
futures contract has been studied by other authors (Johnston 
and McConnell, 1989; Gay and Manaster, 1984). 
 
As the exchange option embedded in the futures contract 
does not trade in any market its value must be estimated.  
Gay and Manaster (1984) presented an estimation method 
based on Margrabe’s (1978) extension of the Black and 
Scholes (1973) option pricing formula.  In Gay and 
Manaster’s (1984) work, the option value was estimated for 
two different varieties of wheat, deliverable within the terms 
of a futures contract traded on the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT).  Both varieties could be delivered at par and, 
therefore, did not involve premiums/discounts.  In our case, 
however, premiums/discounts apply for non-par categories. 
  Therefore, the estimation of the exchange option value 
must take into account these premiums/discounts.  In fact, 
the option values measured are for the right to exchange par 
for non-par categories, or alternatively non-par for par. The 
formulation of Gay and Manaster (1984) is altered as 
follows: 
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where Wt (T, pt, npt) is the value at time t of an option to 
exchange non-par asset np for par asset p at time T; O is the 
premium/discount that applies in case of delivery of the 
non-par category; N() is the standard normal cumulative 
density function, and 
 
d

















dd T t 21
05  ￿￿ V ()
.   ,    (4) 
 
where V is the standard deviation of the difference between 
the rates of return on assets p and np.  The 
premium/discount  O is a fixed value added to the futures 
price in case of non-par delivery.  O is set by the exchange 
to attempt to adjust the futures price to the spot price of the 
non-par category delivered.  In the formulation above, the 
premium/discount is subtracted from the spot price of the 
non-par categories to account for the premium/discounts 
that the holder of the option must account for (if the 
exchange actually takes place) at the time of delivery. The 
parameter V is estimated using the 20 week time series IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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price data preceding  t.  In the formulation above, the 
primary asset is the par category (i.e., the option measures 
the value of the option to exchange non-par category for par 
category).  However, because which asset is regarded as 
primary is arbitrary, the option value was calculated 
reversibly.  This is, the value of the option when the primary 
asset is the non-par category is also estimated (i.e., the value 
of the option to exchange par category for non-par 
category).  If the primary asset is the cheapest of the two 
considered assets to deliver, then the option will be out-of-
the-money.  If on the other hand, the primary asset is more 
expensive, then the option is in-the-money.  Ideally, the 
option value should not be, on the average, significantly 
different from zero.  When the option is out-of-the-money, it 
may indicate that the premiums/discounts are working fine.  
However, there is a chance that the premiums/discounts are 
excessively large or small in a way that drive the option out-
of-the-money.  Therefore, the value of the option for the 
reverse exchange of assets is also calculated.  For the 
premiums/discounts to be functioning properly, both 
options must be out-of-the-money, and therefore, on the 
average, have values significantly indifferent from zero.   
The ratio of option to futures value is estimated to show the 
magnitude of the option value relative to the futures price, 
as in Gay and Manaster (1984). 
 
For the black tiger shrimp, between March 1995 and 
September 1995, the value of the option to exchange the 
16-20 cpp non-par category for the par category is greater 
than the value of the option to exchange the par category for 
the 16-20 cpp non-par category.  However, during this 
period the average value of any option was different from 
zero only at a high level of significance.  Between 
December  1995 and March 1996, on the other hand, the 
value of the option to exchange the par category for the 16-
20 cpp non-par category is greater than the value of the 
option to exchange the 16-20 cpp non-par category for the 
par category.  The value of this exchange option, however, 
is not significantly different from zero, either. However, 
between April 1996 and February 1997, this option 
becomes different from zero at significance levels smaller 
than 0.10, and amounts up to 21% of the futures price.  This 
indicates that the premium is not large enough to cancel out 
the spread between 16-20 cpp cash and futures prices.  The 
options to exchange par and 16-20 cpp non-par categories 
have average values that are not significantly different from 
zero between March 1997 and July 1997.   After the 
premium/discount change in August 1997 and until 
February 1998, the values of the options to exchange non-
par 16-20 cpp for par are different from zero at a 
significance level smaller than 0.10.  Besides the 
premium/discount changes, this situation results from the 
convergence between futures and the 16-20 cpp spot prices. 
 Therefore, the premium for the 16-20 cpp delivery is too 
large.  The largest option to futures value ratio during this 
period is 10%.  From March 1998 to August 1998, the 
average option values for either exchange return to being 
significantly non-different from zero.  
 
Also for the black tiger shrimp, the value of the option to 
exchange the 26-30 cpp non-par category for the par 
category is greater than the vice versa exchange option for 
the periods between June 1995 to March 1996, and June 
1997 to August 1998.  During these time intervals, the 
average option value is different from zero at a significance 
level smaller than 0.10 for August 1997 to October 1997, 
and August 1998.  Between April 1996 and May 1997, the 
option to exchange the par category for the 26-30 cpp non-
par category is deeper in the money.  However, the option 
value is different from zero at a significance level smaller 
than 0.10 only in October 1996. 
 
In the case of the white shrimp, and in particular, the value 
statistics for the exchangeability of par and 31-35 cpp 
categories, from September 1993 to December 1993, the 
value of the option to exchange non-par category for par is 
greater than the opposite exchange option.  This option is, 
in fact, significantly in-the-money.  The ratio of option to 
futures value indicating the economic significance of the 
quality option is up to 16%, on the average.  After the first 
premium/discount changes in the white shrimp contract in 
March 1994, the value of the option to exchange par 
category for non-par turns to be greater than the opposite 
exchange option.  This option is deep in-the-money, at a 
level of significance smaller than 0.05 for most months. The 
option to futures ratio reaches values of up to 47%.  This 
suggests that the premium associated with the 31-35 cpp 
category is smaller than it should be for this period.  Exactly 
the same pattern is observed for the options to exchange par 
and the non-par 36-40 cpp categories.  However, the value 
of the in-the-money options are not as great as they are for 
the 31-35 cpp category.  The largest ratio of option value to 
futures, in this case, is 29%.  For the option to exchange par 
and non-par 51-60 cpp  the deepest in-the-money option 
alternates initially between the one exchanging par for non-
par, and non-par for par.  After the first discount change in 
the white shrimp futures contract, between March 1994 and 
January 1997, the option with the largest value is the one 
exchanging par for the 51-60 cpp non-par category.  The 
average values of this option are different from zero for 
most months at levels of significance below 0.05.  From 
February 1997 to July 1997, the option with the deepest in-
the-money average value is the one exchanging non-par for 
par category.  After August 1997, with the second change in 
premium/discounts in the white shrimp contract, the deepest 
in-the-money option is again the one exchanging par for 
non-par category.  During this period, the in-the-money 
option reaches its largest value, with a ratio of option value 
to futures of nearly up to 17%. 
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4.   PREDICTIVE ABILITY
3 
 
The shrimp futures market ability to unbiasedly predict spot 
prices for each size category is also evaluated in this paper.  
Monthly cash prices for par and non-par shrimp size 
categories (Urner-Barry Publications Inc., 1993-1998) are 
used for the analyses.  Cash prices correspond to the prices 
at the end of the third Friday of the maturity month which is 
assumed to correspond to the last trading day allowed by the 
contracts.  Futures prices, on the other hand, correspond to 
the futures prices 30 days before the last trading day 
allowed by the contracts.  Before the analyses are carried 
out, the series are log transformed as in Antoniou and Foster 
(1994) and Pizzi, Economopoulos and O’Neill (1998).  For 
this study, 35 and 34 monthly observations corresponding to 
the number of contracts traded between 1993 and August 
1998 and 1994 and August 1998 for white and black tiger 
shrimps, respectively, are used.  The data is checked for 
stationary using the Phillips-Perron test and it is concluded 
that all of them can be interpreted to have a unit-root. 
 
The relationship between futures and cash prices in 
commodities is traditionally defined by 
    
  SF tt t  ￿￿ ￿ EE H 01 1     (5) 
 
where St is the spot price in period t and Ft-1 is the futures 
price at time t-1.  Since the data is non-stationary a 
cointegration approach is used.  The 30 day lag time 
between spot and futures prices used for the test in equation 
(2) is chosen due to the fact that most of the trading activity 
in these contracts seems to take place a month before 
expiration.  That period of greater activity should be 
interpreted as the period in which traders operate based on 
most representative expectations about the spot market at 
time of expiration.  This is linked with the futures market 
efficiency, in the sense that a well behaved futures market 
should use all available information.  Agent risk neutrality 
and a rational use of all available information are common 
assumptions underlying this model.  Risk neutrality implies 
a zero risk premium, while the efficient impounding of all 
available, relevant information precludes unexploited 
arbitrage opportunities.  If both parts of the above joint 
hypothesis are confirmed then the current futures price 
serves as an unbiased predictor of the future spot price.   
Acceptance of the joint hypothesis that both assumptions 
hold implies, therefore, that the futures markets demonstrate 
pricing efficiency.  Rejection of one assumption, however, 
can lead to the rejection of the joint hypothesis, but need not 
necessarily imply market inefficiency.  Rejection of the joint 
hypothesis, therefore, may suggest pricing inefficiency, risk 
aversion or both (Antoniou and Foster, 1994; Pizzi, 
Economopoulos and O’Neill, 1998).  Given that we force 
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the assumption of risk neutrality, we limit the discussion to 
terms of futures market unbiasedness rather than efficiency. 
  Since the variables involved show non-stationarity, 
cointegration techniques are used to estimate this 
relationship.  In this paper, the Johansen method is followed 
because it allows for restriction tests, and it is believed to be 
more reliable (i.e., the Granger method tends to provide 
different answers depending on the variable placed on the 
left hand side of the cointegrating equation).  Three tests are 
considered to be necessary to determine whether futures 
markets are unbiased predictors of spot prices.  The first 
one states that spot and futures price series are cointegrated. 
  Some papers assume that this is proof enough of an 
efficient long-term relationship between spot and futures 
prices (Harris, McInish, Shoesmith, and Wood, 1995).  The 
second one is that in the cointegrating regression the 
intercept should be zero and cointegrating vector should be 
equal to one (i.e. Eo = 0 and  E1 = 1).  Other studies have 
assumed these two first conditions to be sufficient for 
market efficiency testing (Crowder and Hamed 1993; Lai 
and Lai, 1991).  The third test for an efficient market 
determines whether the coefficients on futures first 
differences and the error correction term in the error 
correction model (ECM) are equal to one, and the 
coefficients on any lagged spot returns are zero.  Antoniou 
and Foster (1994) suggest that while the first two conditions 
are necessary for efficiency, sufficiency would only be 
implied by showing that there are not important deviations 
from the long-run equilibrium in the short-term. 
 
Trace tests for cointegration reject the existence of any long-
term price relationship between the futures price and all size 
categories for both black tiger and white shrimps. 
Considering that the existence of such a long-term 
relationship is a necessary condition for market 
unbiasedness, the results indicate that shrimp futures 
markets seem not to be able to predict cash prices for any 
size category and shrimp type.  Based on these results, there 
is no need to test for the above mentioned second and third 
conditions (it is not possible either, considering that the 
remaining two test depend on the existence of cointegrating 
vectors): the E0 = 0 and E1 = 1  joint restriction of the 
cointegrating equations; and that in the ECMs the 
coefficients on futures returns and the error correction term 
should be equal to one, and the coefficients on any lagged 
spot returns should be zero. 
 
 
5.   DISCUSSION 
 
It has been shown that the two shrimp futures contracts can 
contribute very modestly to risk reduction by any of the 
hedging strategies studied. 
 
Although the correlation coefficients between futures and 
cash prices of the size categories considered may seem IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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robust for certain size categories, there exist large 
fluctuations in their values in shorter periods that coincide 
with the hedge ratio estimation periods.  Sudden and 
progressive changes in the price relationships affect both 
par and non-par categories.  There is a unsteady correlation 
in the price evolution of the different size categories.  Such 
unstable association between the different size categories 
may stem from the existence of different markets for these 
different categories. 
 
Fixed premiums/discounts seem not to be effective at 
eliminating cash market price differentials between the 
different deliverable grades.  The high exchange option 
values observed for both contracts are a result of the weak 
price association between different cash prices, in a way 
that fixed premiums/discounts are unable to cancel out.  The 
relative independence of the price movements between the 
derivative and cash markets, on the other hand, may also be 
related to liquidity problems in the contracts. 
 
Also, our analyses show that the two shrimp contracts do 
not have ability to predict spot prices.  In fact, the results 
suggest that cash and futures prices are not cointegrated for 
any size category.  This result is not surprising considering 
the poor trading volume associated with these two futures 
contracts. 
 
Liquidity problems contribute to both, lack of hedging 
effectiveness and poor predictive ability.  However, the 
initial relatively high participation and subsequent quick 
drop in the trading interest of the white shrimp contract may 
be explained by in-the-money option to exchange values at 
the beginning of the contract; which, in turn, may also be 
caused by an insufficient initial liquidity of the contract.  In  
 
all likelihood, the initial failure of the white shrimp contract 
to keep traders in the pit probably influenced participation 
in the black tiger contract, too. 
This results suggest that volatility in the price differential 
among varieties makes a case for separate single-delivery 
contracts based, for shrimp, on size categories.  However, 
this would reduce the volume of trade in each single 
delivery contract with respect to the multiple delivery 
contract.  It is known that liquid contracts represent 
substantially cheaper alternatives for establishing a 
reasonable hedge than do thinly-traded contracts even if the 
thinly-traded contract offers potentially superior hedging 
capability (Tashjian, 1995).  In fact, futures contracts with 
actively traded close substitutes are less likely to succeed 
than are new futures contracts without close substitutes 
(Black, 1986). 
 
Theoretically, the current design of both contracts should 
enhance the liquidity of these two futures contracts.   
However, as it has been shown so far, the contracts failed to 
attract trade volume despite the multibillion character of the 
underlying spot market.  The MGE may want to consider 
single-delivery contracts as an alternative that could 
improve the hedging effectiveness of the contracts.  This, in 
turn, may attract a greater volume of traders and increase a 
much needed liquidity for the survival of the shrimp futures 
contracts.  The availability fluctuations of single size 
categories that are characteristic of shrimp supply may 
prevent contract viability, however. 
 
Although it was not explored in this paper, it should be 
noted that another difficulty for the success of any seafood 
as a commodity in futures markets is its lack of transparent 
cash markets.  Broad and transparent cash markets are an 
essential of the foundation for the success of a futures 
contract.  Seafood trading is a highly disaggregated market 
in which individual traders’ bids are generally not made 
public.  Therefore, it is difficult to be sure the futures prices 
for shrimp actually follow those of the cash market.  The 
structure of many cash seafood markets is a major 
disadvantage for the successful implementation of not only 
shrimp but any other seafood product futures contract.  In 
fact, the prices reported by Urner-Barry Publications Inc. 
(1993-1998), and used for this paper, may not fully 
represent the actual cash shrimp market.  Such an opaque 
underlying cash market is incompatible with the information 
requirements of a successful futures contract.  The usual 
seafood trading practices in the cash markets may suggest 
that a large segment of the participants are not interested in,  
or aware of, the beneficial aspects of transparent cash 
markets and futures contracts.  Lack of liquidity/trader 
participation in the shrimp contracts, therefore, may also be 
a reflection of the general seafood sector attitude towards 
more sophisticated trading mechanisms.  The experience 
accumulated from the existence of the two shrimp futures 
contracts can help to understand the limitations associated 
with seafood commodities.  This knowledge can potentially 
help to design new futures contracts for shrimp as well as 
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